I argue that contraception is morally wrong but that periodic abstinence (or natural family planning) is not. Further, I argue that altered nuclear transfer -a proposed technique for creating human stem cells without destroying human embryos -is morally wrong for the same reason that contraception is. Contrary to what readers might expect, my argument assumes nothing about the morality of cloning or abortion and requires no premises about God or natural teleology. Instead, I argue that contraception and altered nuclear transfer are morally wrong because they fail to treat humanity as an inviolable end.
I
The theses of this paper may strike many readers as wildly implausible: I argue that using contraception is morally wrong but that using periodic abstinence to avoid pregnancy is not. 1 Further, I argue that altered nuclear transfer (ANT) -a proposed technique for creating human stem cells without destroying human embryos -is morally wrong for the same reason that contraception is. 2 Readers might suspect that my conclusion about contraception and periodic abstinence is a rationally indefensible tenet of Catholic moral theology, a vestige of medieval notions about the natural purpose of sexual organs, or a symptom of a prudish view of sex. Readers also might suspect that my opposition to ANT follows from an aversion to human cloning or abortion. Contrary to these suspicions, I do not appeal to any premises about God, natural purposes, or the importance of sex in human relationships, and I assume nothing about the morality of human cloning or abortion. Instead, I propose the following argument:
People fail to treat X as an inviolable end if they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of X. People act immorally if they fail to treat humanity as an inviolable end. People act immorally if they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of humanity. [1, 2] If people use contraception or ANT, then they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of humanity. People act immorally if they use contraception or ANT. [3, 4] Focusing solely on ANT would make my presentation of this argument more concise, but doing so would invite the objection that my premises also entail that contraception is morally wrong -a conclusion that many readers would summarily dismiss. The discussion of periodic abstinence does not provide any premise to my argument, but I hope to make my conclusion about contraception more palatable by showing that people who wish to avoid pregnancy need not avoid sex completely.
I do not argue that contraception and ANT violate duties toward people whose creation is prevented. I see no reason to admit the possibility of duties to people who never will exist, although I admit the possibility of duties to people who do not yet exist, such as a duty to preserve the environment for future generations. As I explain below, my argument entails that morality does not consist merely of duties to others.
Some ethicists who oppose the use of contraception base their argument on the principle that people may not intend the nonexistence of any basic good, including the good of human life (see e.g., Grisez et al., 1988 ) . These thinkers sometimes are called " new natural law theorists " because they reject the traditional view of the natural law as directions for perfecting one's nature. In order to distinguish contraception from periodic abstinence, the new natural law theorists describe the nonexistence of a human being as an unintended side effect of periodic abstinence ( Grisez et al., 1988 , 402) . I agree that the distinction between con traception and periodic abstinence is morally signifi cant, but I argue below that people who use periodic abstinence do intend the nonexistence of a human being.
I have explained elsewhere why someone who accepts the new natural law theorists' argument against contraception should conclude that ANT also is morally wrong ( Masek, 2006 ) . People who use ANT intentionally impede a nuclear transfer from creating a human being, as people who use contraception intentionally impede sexual intercourse from creating a human being. 1.
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Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-abstract/33/2/158/903176 by guest on 19 February 2020 II My argument's fi rst premise states, " People fail to treat X as an inviolable end if they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of X. " I do not attempt to identify every way in which a person could violate an end, but one way is to act against or sacrifi ce one end for the sake of another. Someone can decide not to further an end on a particular occasion without acting against that end. For example, a woman who owns a dog would not act against her dog's health if she decides to spend an afternoon taking care of her cat instead of giving her dog a vaccination. In this case, the woman promotes her cat's health instead of her dog's, but she does not act against or sacrifi ce her dog's health for the sake of her cat's health. Suppose, however, that she injects her dog with a virus in the hope that observing symptoms of the dog's illness will show her how to develop a vaccine for her cat. In this case, she does not merely promote another end instead of her dog's health but also pursues a vaccine for her cat at the expense of her dog's health. Therefore, she fails to treat her dog's health as an inviolable end. (I do not argue that someone acts immorally by violating a dog's health; the example merely illustrates one way of violating an end.)
To illustrate why people fail to treat something as an inviolable end if they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of it, suppose that a fi re destroys a forest of redwood trees in City A, leaving only some redwood seeds buried underground. The mayor of the city, Mayor A, wants a factory built on the former site of the redwoods, but the company that will build the factory needs a few years to raise money for the project. The seeds will start growing into trees immediately and Mayor A knows that political opposition to destroying any young redwoods would be insurmountable. In order to prevent any redwoods from growing back while the construction company raises money, Mayor A issues an order to plow the former site of the forest with salt. As evidence that this order fails to treat the redwood as an inviolable end, suppose that Mayor A later campaigns for reelection by saying, " I never have destroyed any redwoods, and I never have promoted industrial development at the expense of the redwood. " The fi rst part of this statement is true, as plowing the land with salt does not destroy any existing redwoods. Nevertheless, Mayor A's political opponents would have good reason to criticize the second part of this statement. The order promotes the end of industrial development at the expense of the redwood since the order blocks the creation of any new redwoods for the sake of industrial development.
( " The redwood " refers to the state of being a redwood as " humanity " refers to the state of being a human.) Someone might defend Mayor A's order, but I do not contend that people act immorally if they intentionally prevent the creation of redwoods. My argument against contraception and ANT is not an argument by analogy since I do not assert that Mayor A's order is morally wrong and then argue that contraception and ANT are similar to the order. Like the example about the dog owner, the example about the redwoods merely clarifi es my argument's fi rst premise: that people fail to treat X as an inviolable end if they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of X. By itself, this premise says nothing about which actions are morally right or wrong. Now suppose that a fi re destroys another forest of redwoods in City B, again leaving only some redwood seeds buried underground. The soil is less fertile in City B than in City A, so no seeds will grow in City B unless the government pays to fertilize the land. The mayor of City B, Mayor B, judges that buying the required fertilizer would exhaust the city's budget and, therefore, decides not to fertilize the land. Instead of keeping the land vacant, Mayor B approves the construction of a factory on the former site of the forest. The actions of Mayors A and B have similar consequences: factories where forests of redwoods once stood. Nevertheless, the two mayors treat the redwood very differently. Declining to exhaust the government's budget in order to produce redwoods is consistent with treating the redwood as an inviolable end (i.e., an end that may not be sacrifi ced for the sake of another). Plowing the land with salt in order to prevent the growth of new redwoods is not. Mayor B, unlike Mayor A, can honestly say, " I never have promoted industrial development at the expense of the redwood. " (Of course, neither mayor can honestly say, " I never have promoted industrial development instead of the redwood. " ) To express the distinction between the mayors differently, Mayor A opposes the creation of redwoods by creating an obstacle to block a process that would create them. Mayor B, on the other hand, refrains from promoting the creation of redwoods but imposes no obstacle to their creation. I use " process " simply to refer to a sequence of causes and effects. Someone who intends to prevent a process from creating an instance of X intends to intervene in that sequence so that causes that otherwise would create an instance of X will not have that effect. For example, Mayor A intervenes in the process of growth from a seed into a redwood tree in order to prevent the creation of a redwood. Suppose, however, that a father learns that his daughter and her boyfriend are about to have sex in a hotel. To keep them from having sex, the father makes a bomb threat to the hotel so that it will be evacuated. Suppose also that the daughter is fertile so that the father's bomb threat interrupts a process (i.e., the process of arousal, intercourse, and conception) that would have created a human being. The father still does not intend to prevent the creation of a human being; instead, he intends to prevent his daughter from having sex. 3 To use a different example, suppose that the daughter decides to date her boyfriend and to abstain from sex altogether so that she can fi nish college before having a child. In this case, she does not prevent the process of arousal, intercourse, and reproduction from creating a human being. No such process exists until she decides to have sex. Therefore, she decides to abstain from , not to intervene in , a process that could create a human being. Since no such process exists until the daughter decides to have sex, the father also would not prevent a process from creating a human being if he dissuaded his daughter from deciding to have sex.
Someone who pursues one end instead of another need not assume that the fi rst end is more valuable than the second. For example, Mayor B might decide that the values of industrial development and of the redwood are incommensurable and then conclude that the high cost of fertilizer provides a good reason to promote industrial development instead of the redwood. This paper does not attempt to resolve questions about the alleged incommensurability of different goods since my argument is consistent both with the view that humanity has an incomparable value and with the view that it has a higher value than other goods.
III
My argument's second premise states, " People act immorally if they fail to treat humanity as an inviolable end. " (I could refer to " rational nature " instead of " humanity, " but questions about any nonhuman rational beings that might exist do not concern this paper.) This premise resembles one of Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative, but I do not contend that Kant would accept the premises of my argument since he maintains only that the moral law requires respect for humanity in a person (see Wood, 1999 , 143 -4) . Contraception and ANT do not disrespect the humanity in a person whose creation is prevented; they prevent a person from existing in the fi rst place. (As noted above, I do not maintain that people who use contraception and ANT violate a duty to a nonexisting person.) Kant seems to agree that contraception is morally wrong, but he supports that conclusion by identifying procreation as the natural end of sexual intercourse, not by arguing that people who use contraception fail to show the proper respect for humanity ( The Metaphysics of Morals , 6, 426). 4 Despite this disagreement, I agree with Kant's argument that the possibility of moral laws requires the existence of something that everyone must treat as an end and that humanity is the most plausible candidate for such an end ( Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals , 4, 428 -9). Kant also maintains, correctly in my view, that the duty to treat humanity as an end is more than a side constraint that forbids an individual from infringing on other people's freedom. Instead, the duty to treat humanity as an end requires people to take positive steps for the sake of humanity (see e.g., The Metaphysics of Morals , 6, 444 -7). Kant's position depends on some controversial principles: that moral laws are possible, that humans share a rational nature, and that morality includes duties to adopt certain ends, not merely duties to respect other people's freedom. Instead of defending all these principles, which this paper cannot do adequately, I use some examples to provide intuitive evidence for the last principle above.
Suppose that a man is drinking lemonade in his backyard when he sees a woman choking next door. The man considers trying to help her or calling a paramedic but decides that he would rather continue enjoying lemonade than trouble himself with his neighbors' problems. Therefore, he sits in his backyard enjoying his lemonade while his neighbor chokes to death a few feet away. The man neither intends nor causes his neighbor's death. He simply does nothing to save her. Nevertheless, I submit that the man acted immorally. A person who learned of his behavior might say to him, " How could you sit there drinking lemonade when someone was dying? Human life should be more important to you! " Someone could criticize the man's inaction in other ways -for example, by arguing that he fails to maximize utility or violates a rule whose obedience would be best for society -but I contend that the clearest and most plausible reason to conclude that he acts immorally is that he shows insuffi cient concern for a fellow human being's life. If so, then this example provides intuitive evidence that morality requires people to take positive steps for the sake of humanity, not merely to refrain from infringing on other people's freedom.
Of course, preserving humanity by saving someone from choking to death differs from promoting or developing humanity. People who use contraception and ANT do not fail to preserve any human being, so I must provide some evidence that people can act immorally by failing to promote humanity. Suppose that two fabulously wealthy parents neglect their children's education but spoil them by working to satisfy their every desire. Their children enjoy many pleasures and luxuries but develop no desire to exercise their humanity (i.e., the rational nature that distinguishes humans from nonrational animals) in any signifi cant way. Even if neither the parents nor their children infringe on anyone's freedom or fail to preserve any human life, I submit that the parents act immorally. Someone who learns of their neglect might say to them, " How could you let your children's minds be wasted? Their education should be more important to you! " Again, someone can defend the conclusion that the parents act immorally in different ways, but I contend that the best way is to say that people can act immorally by failing to promote humanity.
The intuitive judgments in the preceding paragraphs do not reduce my argument against contraception and ANT to a mere appeal to intuition. As noted above, I believe that Kant provides a sound argument that people must treat humanity as an inviolable end. I use the preceding intuitive judgments only to provide additional support for this principle, which serves as the second premise of my argument. The intuitive judgments are not essential to my argument, but the principle that people must treat humanity as an inviolable end is.
Of course, not everyone accepts this principle. Many utilitarians would deny it, and thinkers such as Ross would describe it as a prima facie duty that can be overridden by other considerations. This paper cannot attempt a decisive refutation of every rival moral theory, but thinkers who agree that people must treat humanity as an inviolable end -a group that includes thinkers who accept several different variants of Kantian ethics and natural law theory -ought to conclude that contraception and ANT are morally wrong.
The premise that people must treat humanity as an inviolable end might seem to entail that soldiers or the police act immorally if they use lethal force against unjust aggressors. Pacifi sts might agree, but someone who accepts my argument can avoid pacifi sm in two ways (and possibly in other ways as well):
Admit that soldiers and the police may not kill human beings intentionally but argue that they sometimes may use lethal force and accept death as an unintended side effect (see Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez, 1987 , 310, 315) . This position prohibits using weapons that work only by causing death (e.g., neutron bombs), but it permits using bullets and explosives if the soldiers intend to incapacitate, not to kill, the enemy. A thorough discussion of this position would require a separate paper, but I do say more below about the distinction between intended and merely foreseen effects. Show that someone may intentionally kill a human being while acting with the state's authority. A thorough discussion of this position also would require a separate paper. I do not defend or endorse these two positions in this paper. I identify them merely to show that a duty to treat humanity as an inviolable end does not, by itself, entail pacifi sm.
Before concluding this section, I should explain why I do not say simply that people act immorally if they act against humanity. According to the new natural law theorists, people act against a good whenever they choose " to destroy, damage, or impede " it ( Finnis et al., 1987 , 286 -7) . Compared to this defi nition of acting against a good, my discussion of treating humanity as an inviolable end might seem needlessly complex. Nevertheless, if I argued that people who use contraception and ANT act immorally because they act against humanity, I would face the question, " Why is impeding something's creation, as opposed to destroying or damaging it, acting against it? " If I stipulated that impeding the creation of an end acts against that end, I would need to show that acting against humanity always is morally wrong without fi rst assuming that impeding the creation of a new human is morally similar to destroying or damaging an existing human.
IV
The fi rst two premises of my argument entail the third: " If people intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of humanity, then they act 1.
2.
immorally. " As noted above, I do not maintain that people violate a duty to a nonexisting person when they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of humanity. If my argument is correct, such people act immorally because of what they choose, not because of the effects of their choice. Therefore, my argument assumes that morality does not consist merely of duties to others. Instead, morality includes directions for developing a good character by making good choices. According to this view -which thinkers as diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant acceptsomeone can act immorally by ruining his or her character, not only by violating duties to others.
As evidence for this view, consider video games that glorify the violent and painful deaths of fi ctional people. Playing these games does not violate a duty toward any actual person -assuming that playing the games does not cause the player to engage in real acts of violence toward others. Nevertheless, someone could construct a plausible argument that playing such a video game is morally wrong because a player develops a disordered character by pursuing the destruction of imaginary human life and regarding death as something to be glorifi ed. I do not defend this argument at length because I use the example about violent video games merely to establish the possibility of a morally wrong action that does not violate a duty to other people. Contraception, ANT, and violent video games are not morally wrong for the same reason, but the example of violent video games provides some intuitive evidence that people can act immorally because of what they choose, not only because of how their actions affect other people. V My argument's fourth premise states, " If people use contraception or ANT, then they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of humanity. " In this paper, I defi ne contraception as action intended to prevent sexual intercourse from causing the conception of a human being. Therefore, my fourth premise assumes that conception creates an instance of humanity. By itself, this assumption does not entail that abortion is morally wrong. Someone could argue that a woman may exercise control over her body by aborting a fetus who has the same moral status as a fully developed human (see Thomson, 1971 ). This paper neither accepts nor challenges this argument, as I set aside questions about abortion in order to focus on con traception and ANT.
Someone also could object to my fourth premise by denying that a human zygote or fetus qualifi es as an instance of humanity or rational nature. Human zygotes and fetuses cannot engage in rational activities, but they belong to a species characterized by rationality. I do not mean that undeveloped humans -including zygotes, fetuses, and infants -are instances of humanity because they are potentially rational. Instead, I contend that they are actually rational because they have the potential to engage in rational activities later. (Whether they realize this potential in the future does not determine whether they are rational in the present.) Analogously, zoologists classify beagles and terriers as members of the same species because they can mate and produce fertile offspring. A newborn mutt born of a beagle and terrier is fertile, despite being unable to reproduce immediately after birth, because it has the potential to reproduce later. Likewise, a human zygote, fetus, or infant is rational, despite being unable to exercise reason, because it has the potential to exercise reason later. 5 A thorough argument that humans are rational from the time of conception would require a separate paper. In lieu of such an argument, suppose for the sake of discussion that a human organism (i.e., a member of the species Homo sapiens ) does not become an instance of humanity until 2 years of age. On this assumption, my argument would not apply to people use contraception only to avoid the burdens of pregnancy, not to avoid the responsibility of raising a child. Such people could intend to prevent sex from creating a fetus (in order to avoid the burdens of pregnancy) without intending to prevent sex from creating an instance of humanity years later. Nevertheless, my argument still would show that people act immorally if they use contraception in order to avoid the responsibilities of raising a child. Such people would intend to prevent the creation of an instance of humanity years later, not merely to avoid the burdens of pregnancy. I maintain that a human organism is an instance of humanity at every stage of development, but someone who disagrees still can accept the following modifi ed argument:
People fail to treat X as an inviolable end if they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of X. People act immorally if they fail to treat humanity as an inviolable end. People act immorally if they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of humanity. [1, 2] If people use contraception to avoid the responsibilities of raising a child or if people use ANT, then they intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of humanity. People act immorally if they use contraception to avoid the responsibilities of raising a child or if they use ANT. [3, 4] The modifi ed fourth premise does not assume that conception creates an instance of humanity, but the argument still yields a signifi cant conclusion. I am unaware of any worldwide survey about reasons for using contraception, but I suspect that most users seek to avoid the responsibilities of raising children (even if they have other reasons as well).
Some actions that prevent the creation of a human being also have other effects. For example, suppose that a fertile man falsely believes himself to be 1.
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Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-abstract/33/2/158/903176 by guest on 19 February 2020 sterile and decides to use a condom during sex in order to protect himself from sexually transmitted diseases. Because the man is fertile, his use of a condom prevents sex from creating a human being (assuming that the condom works effectively). Nevertheless, the man does not engage in contraception (as defi ned above) since he does not intend for the condom to prevent conception. Of course, many people who use condoms intend both to protect themselves from diseases and to prevent conception. Such people would engage in contraception. This paper takes no position about the morality of using condoms with the sole intention of protecting oneself from diseases. If this condom use is morally wrong at all, it is not morally wrong for the same reason that contraception is.
Defi ning contraception as action intended to prevent sexual intercourse from causing the conception of a human being entails that people can engage in contraception without having sex. 6 For example, the new natural law theorists discuss the example of a dictator who tries to control population growth by placing a fertility-reducing drug into the water supply ( Grisez et al., 1988 , 369 -70) . These authors -correctly in my view -classify the dictator's action as contraception. A more common example would be a doctor who performs a sterilization. Janet Smith (1991 , 360) criticizes this account by arguing that the dictator " is causing others to engage in contracepted acts, against their will; they are the contraceptors (albeit innocent contraceptors); he is the facilitator. " Smith's description of the dictator contradicts her defi nition of contraception as " all actions taken to impede the union of egg and sperm, before, during, or after intercourse " (Janet Smith, xiii). In the example of the dictator, the couples who drink the tainted water take no action to impede the union of egg and sperm. Their sex is contracepted, but it is contracepted by the dictator . Therefore, the dictator engages in contraception, not the couple. To clarify the distinction between acts of contraception and contracepted acts of sex, suppose that a man has a vasectomy, reads this paper, concludes that contraception is morally wrong and regrets his surgery. The man would not engage in contraception every time when he has sex. His act of contraception occurs when he acts with the intention of preventing conception -that is, when he submits to the vasectomy -not later when that surgery has its effect. 7 So far, this section has argued that all, or least many, people who use contraception intend to prevent a process from creating an instance of humanity. Showing that people who use ANT fi t this description is much easier. ANT is designed precisely to prevent the creation of a human embryo so that scientists can create embryonic stem cells without destroying human embryos. Consider the following description of ANT from its fi rst proponent:
This process does not involve the creation of an embryo that is then altered to transform it into a nonembryonic entity … . From the beginning and at every point along its development, it cannot be designated a living being. No human embryo would be created; hence, none would be violated, mutilated, or destroyed in the process of stem cell harvesting ( Hurlbut, 2004 ) . Some physicians and bioethicists have argued that ANT would create a defective human embryo, not a nonembryonic entity as Hurlbut maintains (see e.g., Byrnes, 2005 ) . I agree with Hurlbut that, at least in principle, someone could produce embryonic stem cells without creating a human embryo. If someone successfully employed ANT, then somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) with the altered nucleus would not create an entity whose rational nature is blocked by a genetic defect. Instead, it would create an entity that completely lacks a rational nature. Nevertheless, practitioners of ANT would fail to treat humanity as an inviolable end because they would intend to prevent SCNT from creating a human being. Unless unaltered SCNT could create a human being, altering the nucleus would be pointless.
Someone might object to my position by describing ANT as a different technology altogether, not a modifi ed form of SCNT. To illustrate this objection, someone might note that that the inventors of the airplane intended to avoid the undesirable features of land travel by creating a new technology. They created the airplane by modifying automobiles, but they did not intend to prevent land travel. Likewise, someone could argue that scientists who employed ANT would intend to avoid the objectionable features of SCNT by creating a new technology. According to this objection, as the inventors of the airplane did not intend to prevent land travel, the scientists would not intend to prevent the creation of a human being. 8 To see why this analogy does not refute my argument, suppose that we ask inventors of airplanes who modifi ed automobiles and scientists who modifi ed cells in the course of employing ANT, " What end did you hope to achieve? " Assuming that they answer truthfully, the inventors would say " We hoped to create a fl ying machine, " and the scientists would say " We hoped to create human stem cells without destroying any human embryos. " Now suppose that we ask each group, " How did those modifi cations achieve your end? " The inventors could answer by referring to principles of aerodynamics, without mentioning that wings will prevent land travel (at least on ordinary roads). The scientists, however, could not explain how altering the nucleus served their purpose without noting that the alteration prevented SCNT from creating a human being. Adding wings to an automobile prevents land travel in the course of enabling fl ight, but altering the nucleus does not prevent the creation of a human being in the course of promoting another end. Preventing the creation of a human being is the whole point of choosing ANT over unaltered SCNT. If altering the nucleus before transfer had another benefi t (e.g., increasing the chance that stem cells would develop), then preventing the creation of a human being could be a foreseen but unintended side effect of ANT. To my knowledge, however, proponents of ANT have not identifi ed any reason to prefer it over unaltered SCNT except that it would prevent the creation of a human embryo.
VI
The four premises above entail that contraception and ANT are morally wrong, but I still must explain why my argument does not apply to periodic abstinence. Like the new natural law theorists, I have argued that people can contracept without having sex themselves , as in the cases of a doctor who sterilizes a woman and of a dictator who places a contraceptive drug into the water supply. Nevertheless, people could not contracept in a situation where nobody has sex. In order to contracept, an agent must intend to prevent some sex -not necessarily the agent's own sex -that could cause the conception of a human being from having that effect. People who practice periodic abstinence do not have this intention since they avoid all sex that could cause conception. Consider the question, " Is any sex contracepted by periodic abstinence? " No sex during infertile periods is contracepted, since it cannot cause conception. No sex during fertile periods is contracepted, since no such sex occurs. Therefore, periodic abstinence is not a form of contraception.
Of course, someone can distinguish periodic abstinence from contraception and still deny that the distinction is morally signifi cant. I suspect that thinkers who oppose contraception but approve of periodic abstinence (including both Smith and the new natural law theorists) often fail to convince readers that there is a morally relevant distinction between periodic abstinence and contraception partly because these authors discuss periodic abstinence in terms of abstaining from sex during fertile periods, not in terms of charting a woman's fertile periods. By itself, abstaining from sex periodically has little in common with contraception, but someone could argue that using contraception and charting a woman's fertile periods to avoid pregnancy are merely two different means of birth control, not two morally distinct actions. Further, thinkers who oppose contraception but approve of periodic abstinence usually use the term " natural family planning " instead of " periodic abstinence. " I suspect that this choice of terms contributes to the suspicion that contraception and natural family planning are merely two different means, one artifi cial and one natural, to avoid pregnancy.
As noted above, the new natural law theorists use the principle of double effect to distinguish contraception and periodic abstinence. I agree with the new natural law theorists that an agent's intention includes the end of the action and all the steps that the agent uses to achieve that end. For example, Boyle writes that " one intends one's ends, the states of affairs one aims to achieve in action, and one also intends one's means, that is, the precise steps one takes to achieve one's ends " ( Boyle, 1991 , 479) . My disagreement with these thinkers concerns their assertion that people who use periodic abstinence choose to abstain from fertile sex " with the intent that the bad consequences of the baby's coming to be will be avoided, and with the acceptance as side effects of both the baby's not -coming -to -be and the bad consequences of his or her not -coming -to -be " ( Grisez et al., 1988 , 402) . To see the problem with this assertion, suppose that a couple who cannot afford a child uses periodic abstinence. The couple seeks to avoid child-care expenses, but the nonexistence of a child is a means, or step in the plan, to achieve that end. Therefore, the couple's intention includes the nonexistence of a child. Analogously, suppose that a young girl is ill and enjoys missing school. She throws away medicine that would cure her illness and make her healthy enough to return to school. Being unhealthy is part of the girl's intention, as being unhealthy is a means to her end. As the girl seeks to avoid school, the couple in the previous example seeks to avoid child-care expenses. As the girl's plan includes her being unhealthy (i.e., her health's nonexistence), the couple's plan includes a child's nonexistence. Without those steps, neither plan could succeed. Therefore, both being unhealthy and the nonexistence of a child fi t the defi nition of intended effects.
I now must explain how people who use periodic abstinence can treat humanity as an inviolable end even though they seek to avoid creating an instance of humanity. In the examples about the dog owner and about the redwoods, I argued that people do not fail to treat something as an inviolable end merely by pursuing another end instead. They fail to treat something as an inviolable end if they act against it for the sake of another end. People who use periodic abstinence may chart a woman's fertile periods so that they can follow through with their decision to promote other ends instead of humanity, but they do not promote another end at the expense of humanity. To clarify this point, recall the distinction between Mayor A's order to plow the potential site of redwoods with salt and Mayor B's refusal to fertilize the site. Mayor A promotes industrial development at the expense of the redwoods. Mayor B merely promotes other ends instead of the redwood. Therefore, the way people who use contraception treat humanity corresponds to the way that Mayor A treats the redwood, but the way people who practice periodic abstinence treat humanity corresponds to the way that Mayor B treats the redwood. (As noted above, the example does not assume that Mayor A acts immorally. It merely illustrates the difference between not promoting an end and acting against an end.)
To make the analogy between Mayor B's order and periodic abstinence more complete, suppose that Mayor B takes a further step to ensure that the order is followed. For example, the mayor might instruct the city's accountants to avoid depositing tax revenues into accounts from which money could be diverted toward fertilizer. This instruction would be analogous to the decision to chart a woman's fertile periods in order to follow through with the decision to pursue ends other than creating a human being. As Mayor B's instruction is consistent with treating the redwoods as inviolable, the decision to chart a woman's fertile periods is consistent with treating humanity as inviolable.
Someone might compare couples who use periodic abstinence by choosing nonprocreative sex instead of potentially procreative sex to scientists who use ANT by transferring a nonprocreative nucleus instead of a potentially procreative one. This analogy fails because the scientists do not simply transfer a nonprocreative nucleus instead of a procreative one. They fi rst intend to change a nucleus into a nonprocreative one. Similarly, people who use contraception do not merely choose between nonprocreative and procreative sex; they fi rst intend to turn potentially procreative sex into nonprocreative sex. As the morally wrong act of contraception occurs when a man undergoes a vasectomy, not later when he has sex, the morally wrong act of ANT would occur when the scientists alter the nucleus, not when they transfer it. Suppose, however, that scientists had procreative and nonprocreative nuclei sitting in a laboratory (perhaps after a mutation created a nonprocreative nucleus) and chose to transfer the nonprocreative nucleus instead of the procreative one. These scientists would be analogous to people who practice periodic abstinence, as neither group prevents a process from creating a human being.
VII
My conclusion about contraception fi nds little support among contemporary thinkers. In fact, ethicists sometimes use the permissibility of contraception as a basic premise in other arguments. For example, several thinkers have objected to Don Marquis's argument against abortion by trying to show that it also would prove that contraception is morally wrong (see Korcz, 2002 ; Marquis, 1989 ). Marquis does not accept this conclusion (see Marquis, 2004 ) , but all parties in the debate assume that people ought to reject any argument that would prohibit contraception. This paper invites readers to reconsider that assumption.
My argument does not entail that the state should prohibit contraception or ANT. Someone can maintain both that these actions are immoral and that they should remain legal, as someone can hold both that lying is immoral and that the state should not prohibit lies. My argument would entail that the state should not fund or advertise contraception and ANT if one could establish that the state should not promote immoral actions, but discussing that principle would require a separate paper. 9 NOTES 1 . People can have many reasons for abstaining from sex, but I use " periodic abstinence " to refer only to abstaining from sex during a woman's fertile periods in order to avoid pregnancy. The notorious rhythm method, which seeks to identify a woman's fertile periods by counting days from the beginning of her menstrual cycle, is only one form of periodic abstinence. Sophisticated forms use more reliable indicators, such as changes in vaginal mucus or body temperature, to identify a woman's fertile periods.
2 . Scientists who employed ANT would alter the nucleus of a cell before using the technique of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). According to proponents of ANT, the alteration would ensure that the entity created by the nuclear transfer lacked the essential characteristics of a human being ( Hurlbut, 2004 ) .
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-abstract/33/2/158/903176 by guest on 19 February 2020 3 . He would intend to prevent a process from creating a human being if he sought to prevent his daughter's sex precisely because he wanted to prevent the creation of a human being (not the sex itself).
4 . References to Kant follow the custom of providing the volume and page number of the German Academy Edition of his works. 5 . In a well-known article, Michael Tooley asks, " What properties must something have in order to be a person, i.e., to have a serious right to life? " and answers, " An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity " ( Tooley, 1972 , 44 ). This answer entails that neither human fetuses nor newborn human infants are persons and that they, therefore, have no serious right to life. To avoid some unpalatable conclusions, Tooley makes ad hoc qualifi cations to extend personhood to human adults who are emotionally unbalanced, temporarily unconscious, or conditioned to desire their nonexistence ( Tooley, 1972 , 48) . Unlike Tooley's position, my view that " rational " is analogous to " fertile " requires no ad hoc qualifi cations to admit that human adults are persons even when they temporarily cannot or do not exercise their reason. I should note that I do not defend the potentiality principle that Tooley rejects (see Tooley, 1972 , 60 -2) . I argue that a human fetus is actually rational in the sense that a newborn mutt is actually fertile.
6 . I do not attempt to determine whether premature withdrawal is a form of contraception or of periodic abstinence. The answer to that question depends on whether the choice to withdrawal prematurely is most accurately described as a choice to stop participating in the process of sexual intercourse or a decision to interrupt that process and to complete it outside of the woman's body.
7 . My position contradicts Smith's contention that a woman who takes a contraceptive pill does not contracept until she has sex ( Smith, 1991 , 361) . According to Smith, " Her act parallels that of a murderer who has loaded his gun with the full intention of murdering: he has not yet murdered until he pulls the trigger and kills his victim; yet if he is thwarted from doing so, he is still guilty of the sin of murder " (ibid). I maintain that the woman in Smith's example is analogous to a man who fi res a gun with the intention of killing someone but whose bullet has not yet hit its target. The man engages in murder when he fi res his gun, as the woman in Smith's example engages in contraception when she takes the pill. Smith errs by not distinguishing planning to act with a certain intention from actually acting with that intention. People use contraception by acting with the intention of preventing sexual intercourse from causing the conception of a human being, not by planning to act with this intention. Therefore, a man who has loaded, but not yet fi red, his gun is analogous to a woman who has prepared, but not yet swallowed, a contraceptive pill. (Whether planning to perform an immoral act is itself immoral does not concern the present discussion.) 8 . I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example. 9 . This paper has benefi ted from the comments of anonymous referees, Michael Dougherty, and Perry Cahall.
